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1. INTRODUCTION 
In 1971 G. Tullock,.published ~is paper on -the paradox of revolutjon·~ \\1bich 
challenged tl1e traditional view of the u.nselfish revolutionary. There he developed a 
-privat.e int.erest. theory of revolution" 1~ .~Nhere individuals are motivated mainly by 
their self int.erest.. This Uleory draV\1S heavily on Olson's concept. of "sele(:tive 
incentives" (Olsort~ 19(5). Selective incentives· are priv~t.e r~"volafd~ that. i~duce people 
t.o participate in a· collective action~ and privat.e penalties that deter tllenl from not 
particif-!ating in it. As applied t.o the theory' of revolution I tllis lneans tbat· 
revolutionaries are eitller induced to act by their expectations of wealth and power~ 
or forced to join tlle revolution by sorne l~ind of social pressure 2. Recently there have 
been sorne attelnpts to· verify thistll€-ory (Silver.. 1974; Crutwright~ Delornle and 
~VOO(t 1985) Vvitll sonle apparent success. 
p~lthough tllere is an if11portant element of truth in the ·privat.e interest theory 
.of revolution"~ there seE:'1l1S to be an essential' ingredient fllissing..This ingredient. can 
. . 
be called group consciousness~ group Inotivation or ideological nlotivatioll. It is an 
ingredient. particularly important in the so-called mass movements. It is difficult to 
.\ believe tl'~at tllere can ~ privaw revY~rds after a revolutio~ Ifor ev~ryone \\1ho takes 
part in it. On the other hand~ 'private penalties for not taking part in a revolution may 
be.. in S01l1e occasions at leastl much more g~nera1 than 'private rewards. Rernaining 
neutral in a mass movement may become too costly for almost everyone after a 
certain moment. But before that happens~ the movement must exist; and it is not 
\ easy to itnagine its coming into being without some kind of ideological motivation. 
ThIs paper is an atternpt to combine ideological and individualistic motivation 
in order to explain people's participation in mass movements. I believe tile argulnents 
developed here are'not only relevant for revolutions. They are revelant for a broader 
class of collective actionsl violent or nonviolentl i~volving large numbers of people~ 
whose aim ~m be called~ in general terms~ institUtional change} 
2. A FORMAL MODEL 
In order to formalize these ideas we shall assume that a typical individual 
member of a group faces the follo"ling payoff matrix 
2· 

N U+G U 
T~ere are two "estates of nature.... E I and E2.. meaning "institutional cbange" 
and "status quo H respectively. A represents some collective action Whose aim is to 
bring about institutional change, The individual has to decide whether to participate 
, in this action .. or to abstain from it.. 'Which is indicated by N. The individual's \Alelfare 
level under the status quo situation is represented by lJ. G represents the utility gain 
. / 
that the individual ,derives from institutional change. In other/words .. it rneasures the 
,I I 
individual's valuation of the public goods generated by ,institutional' change. ¥lIlen E 1 
occurs.. the individual gains G.. r~gardless of whether he participates in the collective 
action or remains neutral. The utility cost of'join~ng' the action is represented by c 1. 
This c:cst may be understood as the expected utility loss associated with possible 
injuries if the action is violent .. time costs .. incom~ costs.. etc. In addition to the cost of 
participation we must ~onsider the cost of abstention.. C2. This cost reprer-~nts the 
penalties imposed by the group on the person who remains neutral.4 
It is assume~l that the individual ca.n assign probabilities to both estates of 
nature. The probability of E 1 is thought to be an increasIng function of the observed 
level of participation in the collective action. Calling v tile fraction of group menloors 
who participate .. we difine 
Prob. (E 1) == ... (v).... (v) ) 0, 0 ~ • (v) ~ I, 0 s v ~ 1 
The expected utilities of alternatives A and N are given by tile expressions 
. . . 

EU (A) = ,(v) (U+G - c 1) + [ 1 -,('1») (U - c 1) 

EU (N) =(I(V) (U+G - C2) of; ( 1 ~4t(v)] (U - C2) 
If the individual does not regarq participation in the collective action as 
something "just" or "unjust"; it seenlS reasonable think that he \\lill definitely join the 
action 'V-lhenever EU(A»EU(N).. an~ abstain' "V'·lhenever EU(A)<EU(N). In cases both 
expected utilities are equal .. there is no optimal alternative., and he Will choose at 
random. 
. Here we want to know -"v\1hat the individual is going to do when he has some 
idealogicallnotivation. "tfl/e say that a p~rson is ideologically nlotivated V\1hen he or she 
valUes participation as something good., and is \\lilling to sacrifice some utility in order 
to contrjbute to the comnlon cause. In this case it seems reasobale to assume that., 
whenev~r EU(A) ~ EU(N)., the individual \ATilt choose to participate \ATi'tll a probability 
equal to one. 
Now the problem arises when EU(J..) <EU (N). In tlllS type/of situation acting 
. /
according. to one's values itnplies a utility loss. This loss' Wi~li -be called "tenlptation" 
.\ 
and measures the incentive. to ignore the group 's in~rest and to act selfishly. This 
temptation can be defined as' 
T= { ~U(N) - EU(A) " ct - C'2 c1 - c2 ) 0 
c. - C2 1 0 
In. tllis paper Cl will be treated as a paranle~r. On ttle other hand., C2 will be 
assumed to depend on two variables: the rate of participation., v., and the relative size 
of the group., s. Bot!?- variables are assluned to be positively related to C2. 
This can be easily justified'. We may think that the more people participate in 
the action., the stronger 'VV'i.ll be the presure on those who remain neutral. Therefore 
life will become more uncornfortable for them \vithin the group. But group hostility 
towards those vmo do not join the common callse and pressure on them Will not be 
/
the same if the group is large or small relative to the entire population. If the group is 
small and scattered \\t"itllin a large societYI there are probably many ways to escape 
social pressw-e for those who wish to remain neutral. Howeverl this may not 00 as 
easy in a larger group ¥,'llose memoors are not a scattered popUlation, but live close 
together and observe each otherall the time.. ­
We may tllerefore rewrite T as folloV\1S 
. t 

. (F(V~ s) F(v~' s) ') 0 
(2) T = 1 0 . F(V., 5) 1 0 
,,\There F(v~s) =c I - C2 (v"s)" 0::;; v s I, 0 s s S 1, C1 is a positive constant" 
aC2 . 3C2
-.->Oand-.->O. 
dV dS 
When the individual is ideologically motivated and T has a posi~ve value., we 
,•
s11all assurl1e that the choice betv-leen participati!lg or abstaining is nor clearly . 

deterrrlined~ but has a probabilistic nature. Furthermore" V·le shall assunle that the 

likely1100d of participation is inversely related to T" and reaches a..Dlaxilnum equal to 

one for T =O. 

Let us also aSSU1i1e tilat everyone in tile group faces tile salne payoff 1l1atrix 

and shares t.he same belief about the justice of the collective action. Then., 'vy~e can 

" identify the individual"s probability of participation Witll tl1e proportion of people in 
'. tile group ~Nho acttlally participates in the action.. That proportion will be inversely 
related to T. . " 
Therefore" there will be a "participation function" that desCribes hO~N the 
participation level - measured by v - varies in response in T. This function is T.flfitten 
, as . 
(3) v =f(T) 
We shall assume that the participation function satisfies the following 

reqUirements., the meaning of which is quite obvious: 

0) f (0) = 1 
(in f(T) < 0 / 
(iii) f"(T) > 0 
(iv) f(T) ~ 0 as T .~fto 
Now we have a system formed by equations (2) and (3). Taking s as giv-&n~ we 

can obtain the equilibriunl values of v and T. 
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Figures I" and 2 show two possible situations: The former shoT,NS a case of 
unique equilibrium and H1e laUer a case of mUltiple equilibria: in both figures it has 
been assumed that C2(V" s) is a linear fuilcti,on of v. 'Nhich implies that F(v" s) is also 
linear ~;th respect to that variable" In Fig:ure I T is al"W'ays above zero for any valu~ 
of v in the relevant range. On th(;? oth~r hand" in Figure 2" T-becomes equal to zero 
\hlhen v is 'high en(>ugh. This may occur" if" f9f "instance, c2 groV'lS very fast as v rises . 
. Then" after SOBle point, c 1 - c2 (v" s) < 0" which iluplies T =O. "'fhen this happens" the 
lloon1ptation function function (2) - beconles a horizontallirle and coincides with the H ­
v 	axis. 
Solne casual stability analysis tnay show that point p in Figure 1 represents a 
stable equilibriuln. In order t.o see this.. let us assume an initial participation level 
equal to vo· Given the telnptation function" that inlplies a T value .equal to To. But To 
generates" at a later moment" a participation level equal to v 1. This participation will 
later generate a temptation equal to TL and the process 'Will continue until 
equilibrium p is reached.' A similar argument can be used to show that an initia.l 
participation level below ve would set up a process again leading to p. 
/ 
~ ~ 	 .~/ 
In Figure 2 we have three equiiibrium pOints.. p L P2.'and p 3. Using tha saIne 
kind of argument as before" it c~uld be easily sho'Nll that p I and P3 represent stable 
equilibria, whereas P2 represents an unstable one. 
.An equilibrium such as p in Figure 1 repre~nts a situation where the collectlve 
, 	 action is carried on by people "v\1hose baSic motivations are ideological. The temptation 
in this case has a positive value. That means that people \'/bo take part in that action 
are sacrificing some welfare on behalf of their group. In this respect the situation is 
similar to those described by equilibria PI and P2 in Figure 2. 
Equilibriur.a p3 in Figure 2 shows a sOlnewhat different situation. Here ttl€' 
temptation is worth zero, which means (presumably) that c 1 < C2 (v.. s). If that is the 
case" the expected utility of 'participating is actually higher than tllat of remaining 
neutral. The cost of abstention is too high and everyone- is led to participate in the 
collective action. Ideological motivations here are irrelevant. 
In the 
kind of situation depicted in Figure I it is obvious that an increase in the cost of 
participation, c L would reduce v (and increase T) and a decrease in C I v/ould have 
the oppOSite effect. The same could 00 said about the effects of changes in C L if the 
initial situation is such as that descri~ed by equilibrium PI and P2 in Figure 2. 
N~v~rthel~ss" an equilibriu1n such as P3 in Figure 2 inay not be sensitive to changes 
6 
- -
. . 
in the cost of participation unless these changes 'are large enough. The reason for this 
is Ule following. As long as c 1 <c2 {1" st T ts going to remain equal to zero. The value 
of c 1 may change without necessarlly nla}{ing T differ{?nt from zero. Therefore" as 
long as T does not Change" v will retnain-equal to o~e. 
. The changes in the relative size of the grouPI s. originate changes of the sarne 
sign in tl"le cost of abstention} C2 . Tl1is rne~tlis that tile te~liptati()n fun(:t~on shifts up 
'v.Jllen s goes dO\"lh.. and dOVln v"hen s goes up. Therefore} an increase in s v.,ill 
originate- a higher participation level (v increases and T goes do"m) and a decline in s· 
reduces the participation level (v decreases a.nd T goes up). If the initial situation is 
an ~quilibriuln such as P3 in Figure 21 those reactions rna~' only be noticeable for 
relatively large changes in s. The reason is similar to triat given above in relation to 
the effects of changes in c1. 
3- CHAJIGES II'I GROUP SIZE 

. / 

:. 
So far tile changes in tile group's relatlve size- bave- b~n treated as exogenous. 
Hovo/ever.. this variable -rnay J:>e at least partially endog~nous to tlle " model.- In order 
to see tillS let. us consider t.he"follov,'ing situation. 
" A group is carrying on sonle collective action aimed at improving certain 
aspects of their society. A certain equilibrium level of participation bas been reached 
on the basis of ideological lnotivations. Nevertheless .. the participation rate is qUite 
low, 'W1li<;h nleaos that tile probability of reaching. the desired institutional cbangesl 
(J(V), is rather srnall. If the collective action is not successful for a period of time} sonle 
people may revise. -their beliefs and their ei&:pectations. These people rflay sinlply 
cease to belieVe ti1at tile action has anything to do willi the desired aim. Institutional 
change may tilen seeln unattainable and the collective action totally useless. These I 
people will no longer be ideologically lllotivated and cease to participate in the action. 
What happens here can be interpreted as a reduction in the group·s relative 
size. There are less people sharing tile saffle basic set of expectations and ooliefs. And.. 
as we saw before, a reduction in group size leads to a reduction in participation. The 
effect of ttJis is likely to be cumulative. Less and less people participate, whic1l1eads 
to a further deterioratlon of beliefsl ne~l reductions in size and lower participation 
rates. In otiler words, failure breads failure in a cumulative process, wltll the 
collective action - and the group itself - eventually desappears. 
7 

. t 
. . . 
The same a.s failure breads failure} it is likely that success breads success. If a 
collective action is initially successful and achives sonle partial. goals} this. is 1iltely to 
reenforce tlle 1l1otivatiolls of tllose Tytllo partjcipate. In addition to this} 1110re people 
will becollie aware tllat they have intere?ts similar to those lNllo participate in th~ 
. action, and tllat fighting for those jnter.ests is, "legitirnat.e" and "good". 
P.ll this can be interpreted as an increase in tile group's relative size. As a 
r~sult.} the t.etllptatlon function shifts d()vin and tjl~! equilibriunl level of participation 
tends to increase. If the process is curnulative and group sfzf! l{eeps increashlg, this 
~u1d eventually lead to an eq,uilibriuln such as' p3 in Figure' 2 \\1tlere the 
participation rate is equal to one. T-tle cost of abstention baconles too high and 
everyone in tlle group is led to participate. Ideological motivations here become 
uninportant. 
4. LEADERSHIP 
. /In . tile previous analysis we have cOl11pletely 19nored tile question of 
I 
leadership. "'Ne have aSSU1l1e~ tllat there is SOllle collective action going on and tlJat 
each ~r8on has to decide whether to join it or to renlain inactive. But for a collective 
action to be carried on,.there rnust exist a group of people \\1ho sllare"son1e degree of 
group consciousness. Nevertlleless.. people are not always am.re that tle:y have 
potentially inlportant interests in cornmon with ·otilers. And, even wtlen tlley are 
aware} it nlay be difficult for thetn to recognize those \,1110 share their inrorests and 
beliefs. 
This is YY\lhy ,leaders are illlportant. Leaders can be ttlought of as id~ologi(:al 
E:ntrepreneurs who are able to capture what the con1nlon interests of relatlvEdy large 
groups of people are~ Their function is to preach, to convince other people, and to 
rnake thern participate in collective actions. vVitll0ut leadership.. collective actions" 
espeeially those requiring large numbers of people, woul~ probably never come into 
being. 
In principle tile motivations of a leader are not different from ~nyon0 else's. 
The srulle as other people} a leader 111ay respond boll1 to ideological (group oriented) 
and to estrictly selfis~ motivations. However, there is some reason to believe" at least 
in very general terms, that the actions of the leaders can be best understood in terms 
of selfish'motivations. 
. . 
As we have seen before, ideological lllotivations nlay lead rational people to 
participate in collective actions. Nevertheless, if we are u) follOw traditional tl1inking 
in econonlics.. "\Ie would never expect participation to be -relevant whenever the cost 
. . . 
of acting ideologically is very high.. . 
Leaders usually put more tinle and effort into collective actions.. and take more 
risl{s.. Ulan follo"Yyers. This rneans ttlat tl"Je CQsts of acUng ideologically are probably 
quite high for tile .for1ner. Tllerefore.. ""le V\-~ould not expect lea<1~rs to act exclusively 
on tile basis of ideological nlotives. They \\lould 00· tnuch lnore likely to respond to. 
"positi~ s~le(:tive inventives". These incentives are said to exist when the leaders of 
a gr.oup expect to obtain some private re'V'lards for their orga!lizing activity. In otller 
words.. we are saying that ttle leaders'. basic motivations are likely to 1~ their o,",,"!l 
expectations of wealth and power. 5 . 
5- FIlIAL r..E!:!An.:g:S 
The previous analysis is quite general in its conclusions. Nevertlleless.. it a11o",/s 
us to dra'~'" a pictul~e of v·lhat is lit.ely to happen -in a revoluti9ri.. or any other "tnass 
.\ movement." (violent or t:l0n-violent.) whose aim is institutional change. 
The process is usually start.ed by a leader (or a grQup of leaders) who respond 
basically to. individualistic motivations (positive selective incentives). The general 
public·s initial response is essentially ideological. That nle~ns that those 'A~ho join the 
fJlOVerJlent have to sacrifice some 'V'lelfare on behalf of "....That tlley consider to be the 
\ group·s int.erest. This initial ideological response can be rather extensive .. particularly 
when the costs of acting ideologically are low. If the process is successful in the initial 
stages.. it is likely to become more generalized and· to involve every tirne rnore and 
more people. As tlle process goes on.. the cost of abstention gro¥lS and ideological 
tnotivation loose g~oulld. In otller "'>lords.. e-:r...i.ernal pressure and fear of tlle otl1ers 
t>eCOlne tile leading 1110tive for the follo~Ners of a mass movetnent. 
The model developed in tllls paper (:ould be improved by relaxing some of its 
lllost restrictive asslunptions. For instancel one could allow for different people t.o 
have different. payoff nlatrices. Also... the costs of participation and of abstention 
could be considered partially contingent upon the estate of nature. There could be 
more than just two estates of nature and several rnutually exclusive collective actions 
leading to those "estates" with different probabilities. All this \'Vould certainly 
conlp1icate tile analysis.. but lnight open an interesting line of theoretical enquiry. In 
any case.. the lnodel.. as it stands .. seems to capture tlJ.e essential ingredients of the so 
called nlass lnOVe1l1ents. To what extent that picture is empirically correct renlains .. of 
coursel an open question. 
ROTHS 

(1) 	 This term is taken from Silver (1974). Tullocl{ called it tile "by-product 
tlleory of revolution" (TulloCl~1 1971). 
. (2) 	 The fact that people fIlay be forced to tal(e sides 'in a reT-lolution, V...11ic11 
fIl(~anS that rernaining neutral rnay be .costly, is not tal{en into account in 
Tulloct·s Inodel. 
The terms "111a,SS tllOVement.. and ,"institutional change" may,heipi I belie".J'e.. 
to avaoid an ad hoc definition of "revolution" or a lengthy discussion about 
tile Ineaning of tilis "\lord. 
(4) 	 The Satlle as tilere is an action ailned at institutional change, there could be 
another in defense of the status quo. 
The potential defenders of the status quo would be those who believe 
institiutional change to be a source of public nbads". This nleans tllat tile G 
term in the relevant payoff matrix is negative. In this ca,Se there vlould also 
be participation costs and abstention costs. The individual's decision tl1al{ing. 
process v.iould not be different at all from that of a pi-rson "'lith a positive G. 
(5) .A leader's payoff rnatiix could be represented as folo\'t~: 
1'1 U+G U 
TIle private revnrd IH:~re is associated to tile leader·s participation in the 
collective action. It is represented by B. The value of B could in principle 
depend on the estate of nature. One ""ould expect it to be higher under E 1 
Ulan under E2. The leader's participation rnay a1sG influence Ule probability 
of acbieving the desired estate of nature in a positive way. 
Y-le have assumed that leaders face very high participation costs. If there 

were no private rewa.rds, (that is..-vvitll B=O)I th~ temptation to abstain 

. would be very strong. Nevertileless" this is more than offset by high values 

of B. 
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